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Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of
Capital Punishment
Carol S. Steikert & Jordan M. Steikertt
Introduction
Fifty years ago, in the early 1960s, death penalty
abolitionists in the United States began a litigation campaign to
bring an end to capital punishment in the United States. Over the
next few decades, abolition would sweep through Europe and the
Anglo-American legal world, where it now appears firmly
established. In the United States, however, the constitutional
abolition imposed by Furman v. Georgia' in 1972 was tentative
and short-lived. The Supreme Court's re-authorization of the
death penalty in 1976 led to a raft of new capital statutes and a
rising tide of executions. The Court's approach to the death
penalty in the post-1976 "modern era" of American capital
punishment diverged, however, from the deferential, federalist
approach of the preceding two centuries, during which states
retained virtually complete control over death penalty practices.
Rather, the Supreme Court inaugurated an ongoing project of
federal constitutional review of capital punishment, through which
it developed an intricate body of Eighth Amendment doctrine. The
United States became the first and only one of its peer nations to
move not from formal retention of the death penalty to abolition,
but rather from retention to regulation.
Writing in the mid-1990s, we criticized the Supreme Court
for failing to provide effective regulation of capital practices, while
simultaneously creating a misleading impression of extensive
judicial oversight.2 The Court's capital jurisprudence, though
arcane and intricate, placed few meaningful restrictions on state
t. Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
It. Judge Robert M. Parker Endowed Chair in Law, University of Texas School
of Law.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 357 (1995).
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capital practices. But the very existence of a seemingly extensive
(though in fact minimally intrusive) body of federal constitutional
law worked to entrench and legitimate the death penalty. We
lamented the ways in which judicial efforts to rationalize capital
punishment had created the worst of all possible worlds-a system
that did very little to cure the arbitrary and discriminatory
administration of capital punishment but gave the reassuring
appearance of doing much more. We attributed the soaring rates
of death sentences and executions in the 1990s in part to the
legitimating effect of the Supreme Court's project of constitutional
regulation.
Then everything changed. Starting in 2000, the number of
death sentences and executions plummeted for more than a
decade, and several states recently have legislatively repealed the
death penalty for the first time since the 1960s. In the mid-1990s,
American abolition appeared an extremely remote prospect.
Today, less than two decades later, the potential for abolition looks
very different, and the question seems to be more one of when and
how-rather than whether-the American death penalty will
3
expire. Our consideration of the causes of this precipitous and
unexpected turnaround has led us to the surprising conclusion
that the same regulatory reforms of the modern era that we
described as legitimating and entrenching the practice of capital
punishment have also contributed to its recent destabilization.
Doctrines and institutions created by constitutional litigation have
slowly created an environment that is less hospitable to the
continued robust use of the death penalty and have provided a
blueprint for further reform or even abolition, but in ways that
were not anticipated by the initial reformers (nor by us, writing in
the 1990s).
In this Article, we trace the ways in which contemporary
efforts to regulate the death penalty have produced such
unforeseen and surprising results. We contrast the effects of the
death penalty reforms of prior generations-such as narrowing the
scope of death-eligible crimes, privatizing and centralizing
executions, and improving execution methods-with the reforms of
the modern era, arguing that the current regime represents a
fundamental break with past modes of regulating capital
punishment. First and foremost, the death penalty is now subject
to extensive legal regulation, in contrast to the virtually
3. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Beginning of the End?, in
THE ROAD TO ABOLITION: THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 97, 98 (Charles J. Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds., 2009).
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unregulated practice of prior generations. Second, extensive legal
regulation has produced a significant gap between death
sentencing and executions, creating a large class of death row
inmates who are housed in increasingly restrictive conditions,
many of whom face no foreseeable likelihood of execution. Third,
death penalty litigation is increasingly performed by a specialized
defense bar, as "generalists" have been replaced by (or
supplemented with) capital trial lawyers, state postconviction
lawyers, and federal habeas lawyers. Fourth, and relatedly, the
primary focus of capital trials. has shifted from the question of
guilt or innocence of the underlying offense to the punishment
issue of life or death. This shift is not merely one of degree or
emphasis; it amounts to an entire rethinking of the obligations of
trial counsel and of the function of the death penalty trial. Fifth,
death-penalty states have made sentences of life without
possibility of parole virtually the sole alternative to death as the
punishment for capital offenses (in contrast to earlier generations,
in which death-eligible offenses were punishable by terms of years
or life imprisonment with parole eligibility).
These reforms of the modern era, unlike those of prior
generations, contain within them the seeds of destabilization and
have in fact rendered the American death penalty quite
precarious. This is true notwithstanding the fact that most of the
changes to American capital punishment in the modern era were
not designed or expected to undermine the death penalty. Rather,
contemporary capital practice reflects various efforts to tame the
death penalty by making its administration more regularized, law-
like, and humane. Such a path might have been expected to
increase the death penalty's legitimacy by adapting it to
contemporary sensibilities, and during the early period of the
modern era, the reforms likely supported the continued use of the
death penalty. But whatever legitimacy gains have been produced
by the modernizing project of capital reforms, they have been
swamped-especially during the past decade-by the counter-
vailing dysfunction wrought by extensive legal regulation of the
death penalty. The sheer cost of capital proceedings, the
uncertainty of executions, and the resulting dramatic decline in
capital sentencing are looming problems for the continued use of
the death penalty in the United States. Judicial abolition-on the
heels of legislative abolition by a critical mass of states-is a
genuine prospect on the horizon.
These observations offer insights into at least two debates
about capital punishment. First, one of the most important and
perplexing questions about the death penalty is the relationship
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between "reform" and "abolition." On the one hand, "civilizing" the
death penalty by removing its worst excesses-whether in the
form of "botched executions" or unsavory applications, such as
against the young or mentally impaired-might stabilize the
institution and mute public opposition. On the other hand,
capital "reform" might be viewed as the precursor to abolition,
especially if the "reform" tends to highlight the viability of
noncapital options or undermines the perceived goals of capital
punishment.' By contrasting the effects of earlier generations of
death penalty reform with those of the modern era, we are able to
develop a fine-grained picture of the complex ways that particular
death penalty reforms have restructured the institutional land-
scape and made it more or less favorable for abolition. This very
particular picture, in turn, might help us to understand more
generally how legal reform can lead to either entrenchment or
destabilization or both, so that law reformers can better predict
the effects of future efforts.
Second, how does the prospect of abolition in the United
States relate to the already completed abolition in our peer
countries? Some sociological theorists see abolition as the end
stage of a centuries-long process of "civilization" and the develop-
ment of the modern liberal state in which the death penalty is
progressively narrowed, limited, privatized, and rendered more
humane, until eventually it disappears.' In this account,
American progress toward abolition has been slowed or halted in
recent decades, but its eventual accomplishment will be part of the
same long trajectory that our peer countries have followed. Others
have argued that American abolition, if it occurs, will owe a large
debt to the example of our peer countries, who will put political
pressure on the United States to join them and who will influence
our citizens and judges in softer but more pervasive ways that will
4. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support
Legislative 'Reform' of the Death Penalty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 425 (2002)
("Abolitionists could and should engage in nuanced, case-by-case analysis of the
legitimating or entrenching potential of each proposed legislative reform.").
5. Id. at 430 (describing potential "anti-legitimating reforms" that might
"plant the seeds for future reform or abolition").
6. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH
PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 72 (2010) ("[I]t is possible to outline the general
pattern of change in Western nations and to develop an explanatory account of how
social developments transformed the institution [of capital punishment]."); see id.
at 71 (noting that "the civilizing processes" described by sociologist Norbert Elias
"certainly played a part" in the abolition of the death penalty in Western nations,
though it must be complemented by a more comprehensive account of the social
processes at work).
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help to bring about eventual abolition. Our account stands in
contrast to both of these arguments. American abolition, if it
occurs, will be in large part the product of a distinctively American
project-the intensive legal regulation of capital punishment-
that is separate from and in contrast to the abolition experiences
of other nations. This regulatory project carried within it the
inevitable seeds of destabilization and decline of the death penalty,
in ways that neither the abolitionist litigators nor the reformist
judges who created it anticipated. Just as there have been
theories of American exceptionalism to account for our outlier
status in retention, so does recent experience suggest a unique-
and exceptional-path to abolition.
I. Early Reform
Given the present status of the United States as the only
Western democracy that has retained the death penalty,' it is easy
to lose sight of the early efforts of American civic leaders and
American jurisdictions to reform the death penalty and ameliorate
its harshness. At the time of the nation's founding, all states
authorized capital punishment, having inherited the punishment
from England as the ordinary response to murder.0  Our
Constitution appears to presume the existence of the death
penalty, with the reference to deprivations of "life" in the Due
Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses,'o and the explicit mention
of "capital" crimes in the Grand Jury Clause." The death penalty
was available for many crimes apart from murder-burglary, rape,
manslaughter, arson-though not so many as the famously long
list of capital crimes in England."
7. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 180-83 (2003) (describing "the capital punishment policy and
attitudes of other developed nations" as first on a list of "the major cultural and
political influences on the institutions and decision makers who have the power to
make death penalty policy").
8. JOHN F. GALLIHER ET AL., AMERICA WITHOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (2002)
("The continued use of capital punishment distinguishes the United States from all
other Western, industrialized nations.").
9. See id. at 5-23 (detailing the historical origins of English capital
punishment and its influence on the development and application of the death
penalty in the American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Id.
12. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 81 ("[Tlhe expansion of England's capital




A. Scope and Discretion: Narrowing the Range of Crimes
Subject to the Death Penalty
The same Enlightenment forces and republican ideologies
that contributed to our Revolution also generated skepticism about
the efficacy and desirability of the death penalty. Many of our
founders-including James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin
Franklin, and Benjamin Rush-were familiar with Cesare
Beccaria's pathbreaking critique of the death penaltyl3 and
accordingly advocated restriction or abolition of capital punish-
ment." Perhaps the first and most significant reform of the U.S.
death penalty came in Pennsylvania with the decision to recognize
degrees of murder. That decision was wholly designed to limit the
reach of the death penalty, with only murders in the first degree
warranting the punishment of death. Pennsylvania's innovation
spread to many other states, and its decision in the 1790s to
protect even some murderers from the death penalty was quite a
radical transformation. Pennsylvania's decision was palatable in
part because of the emergence of the penitentiary, which provided
incarceration as an alternative to the physical punishments and
fines, which had been staples of eighteenth century punishment.
Pennsylvania's recognition of degrees of murder was followed by
the decision of many states, including Pennsylvania, to make
many previously capital crimes noncapital; in the early nineteenth
century, many northern jurisdictions eliminated the availability of
the death penalty for rape, robbery, burglary, and arson-to the
point that treason and murder became the sole capital offenses in
northern states by 1860." In the South, too, the number of capital
crimes was restricted-at least as applied to White persons,
though the death penalty was available for a wider range of crimes
for African Americans (both free and enslaved).1
Although some proponents of narrowing the range of death-
eligible crimes were likely motivated by broader opposition to the
death penalty," many others urged such narrowing to protect the
13. CESARE BEccARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 71-76 (Graeme R.
Newman & Pietro Marongiu trans., Transaction Publishers 5th ed. 2009) (1764).
14. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 91-97
(2002); HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH
PENALTY MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994, at 7 (1996).
15. BANNER, supra note 14, at 131.
16. Id. at 139 ("By the Civil War capital punishment for [W]hites was, with a
few exceptions, in practice reserved for murder throughout the South nearly as
much as in the North.").
17. At the same time that many American jurisdictions were narrowing the
reach of the death penalty, a few others were abolishing it altogether. Michigan
abolished the death penalty in 1846 for all crimes other than treason, followed
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death penalty. This is a recurrent theme surrounding American
death penalty reform-the uneasy alliance between abolitionists
and retentionists to improve the American death penalty. From
the retentionist perspective, broad death-penalty eligibility
frequently caused prosecutors, judges, and especially jurors to
resist convicting guilty offenders based on the perceived
excessiveness of the punishment. Excessively harsh availability of
the death penalty-evident in the recourse to this sort of
nullification-tended to undermine the death penalty. Thus, for
retentionists, narrowing the death penalty was a means of
strengthening the death penalty rather than a step toward
eliminating it. More generally, reform of the death penalty was
often inspired not necessarily by concerns about the death penalty
per se, but by a larger shift in attitudes regarding the causes of
crime and the purposes of punishment. The movement to
penitentiaries, reflecting a greater confidence in the prospects for
rehabilitation (and a correspondingly diminished belief in funda-
mental depravity), rendered the death penalty less appropriate or
necessary for a wide range of offenders."
The second significant reform of the death penalty-related
to the first-was the decision of American jurisdictions to give
sentencers the choice to withhold the death penalty, even for
offenders convicted of first-degree murder. The introduction of
discretion was in part motivated by the same impulse to reduce
the number of capital crimes-the fear that jurors would nullify to
avoid imposition of the death penalty in particularly undeserving
cases.19  The movement toward discretion was a long process,
initiated in Tennessee in the 1830s and gradually embraced
universally by capital jurisdictions over a lengthy period (right up
to the 1950s and 1960s).20
closely by total abolition of the death penalty in Rhode Island in 1852 and
Wisconsin in 1853. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 21 (3d
ed. 1982). Michigan is thus regarded as the first English-speaking jurisdiction in
the world to achieve abolition. Id.
18. Louis P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION 5 (1989) ("Condemnations of the
death penalty marked the emergence of a new understanding of crime and
punishment. Essayists argued that social influences, not depravity, caused crime
and that reformation, not retribution, should govern punishments.").
19. Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An
Historical Note, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 49, 49-51 (Hugo
Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976).
20. BEDAU, supra note 17, at 9-12.
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B. Changing Sensibilities: Privatizing and Humanizing
Executions
The third major capital reform was the movement of public
executions to inside jail or prison walls. Again, this reform was
not primarily or even significantly a reflection of widespread
doubts about the wisdom of the death penalty; rather, the
emergence of a middle class in the nineteenth century, which
cultivated a sense of refinement and culture, regarded public
executions as the province of the lower elements of society."
Public executions were no longer regarded as religious, edifying
rituals (characterized by solemn sermons), but instead were
viewed as raucous, raw spectacles (although it is not altogether
clear that the actual practice had changed that significantly). This
newly emerging sensibility caused states to require the removal of
executions from public view beginning in the 1830s.22 By 1860, all
northern states, as well as Georgia, had abolished public hangings,
and much of the South banned such hangings by the end of the
nineteenth century.2 3
Abolitionists often supported privatizing executions to
demonstrate their lack of utility as a deterrent.24 Indeed, this
argument had something of a self-fulfilling character, because the
prevailing deterrent value of executions was likely diminished by
privatization. But death penalty supporters also embraced priva-
tization based partly on a fear that the unfavorable publicity
surrounding particularly raucous or unseemly executions would
threaten the continued practice." In part, the movement from
public to private executions reflected the changing role of capital
punishment. As the political and religious roles of the death
penalty diminished, and the death penalty became less a symbol of
state or church authority than an ordinary exercise of modernizing
criminal justice systems, the need for public execution ceremonies
likewise diminished.2 6 In this respect, the decision to remove
21. See JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK 43 (1997) (describing legislative
motivation to curtail the "spectacle" of executions and their "demoralizing" effects).
22. Id. at 44-45.
23. Id. at 154-55.
24. Id. at 45 (quoting a Massachusetts legislative report stating that "the
privatization of executions was 'a virtual abandonment of the argument that
capital punishment is calculated to deter from the commission of crime'" and
describing privatization, through the eyes of an abolitionist Wisconsin state
senator, as an "entering wedge [by abolitionists] to take more sweeping action").
25. Id. at 71 ("(Many private execution laws were enacted in the midst of
credible legislative attempts to abolish capital punishment entirely.").
26. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 87-96 (describing emergence of the "modern
mode" of capital punishment in the nineteenth century).
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executions from public view signaled a different role for capital
punishment rather than an emerging desire to end the practice
altogether.
The experience in Minnesota reflects an extreme effort to
shield the public from executions. In 1889, Minnesota passed
what was dubbed the "Midnight Assassination Law," which
required not only that executions be conducted privately, but in
the early hours of the morning with an extremely limited number
of spectators." The end of executions in Minnesota was wrought
by a botched execution by hanging almost two decades later, in
which the condemned, William Williams, fell to the floor when the
trap door was opened because the sheriff had miscalculated the
proper length for the rope.28 Deputies had to prop up Williams to
facilitate his strangulation, and despite the Midnight
Assassination law, the newspapers caught wind of the story and
published it." In the wake of those events, three Minnesota
papers-the St. Paul Pioneer Press, the St. Paul Dispatch, and the
St. Paul Daily News-were all fined (after unsuccessful legal
challenges to their prosecution). More importantly, Minnesota's
governor subsequently recommended abolition of the death
penalty in his next legislative address, and the legislature
overwhelmingly approved abolition a few years later, in 1911.31
Some southern jurisdictions retained public hangings for
rape into the early twentieth century. This retention may have
been partially motivated by a desire to prevent lynchings." One of
the last public executions was conducted in Kentucky in 1936.
Although the defendant had committed murder as well as rape, he
was charged only with rape so that his execution could be
conducted in public view; Kentucky law punished murder with
electrocution in the state penitentiary but authorized public local
executions for the crime of rape.
27. BESSLER, supra note 21, at 98.
28. Id. at 110.
29. Id. at 110-11.
30. Id. at 120.
31. Id. at 124-25.
32. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of
Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 649 (2010). But see
BANNER, supra note 14, at 154 ("Public execution held on longer in parts of the
South, where the mounting frequency of lynchings prevented [W]hites from
becoming too sensitive to the public display of violence.").
33. See 10,000 See Hanging of Kentucky Negro, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1936, at




The end of public hangings undoubtedly challenged some
bases for retaining the death penalty, particularly its role in
dramatically illustrating to the public the cost of crime. In the
end, however, shielding executions from public view also deflected
criticism about the barbarity of the punishment and might simply
have "adapted" the death penalty to modern sensibilities. As one
historian observed, "[s]ome of the death penalty's later opponents
looked back with mixed feelings at what they came to see as a bad
bargain, in which supporters of capital punishment had bought off
much of the opposition by agreeing to remove executions from
public view."'
The same sensibilities that sought to shield the public from
executions also led to efforts to humanize executions by making
them less painful and less visibly destructive of the body. In the
late 1800s hanging began to give way to electrocution because, as
the Williams episode in Minnesota demonstrated, inexpert
hangings led to prolonged death, decapitation, or some other
mishap. Although the first electrocution was botched, refinements
of the method led to greater enthusiasm, and many states moved
from hanging to electrocution between 1890 and 1950." Some
states also moved to lethal gas (as an alternative to either hanging
or electrocution) because of the apparent minimal pain and
minimal destruction of the body: hanging could crush the neck
and electrocution could cause burns. More recently, virtually all
jurisdictions have moved to lethal injection-again based on a
desire to inflict minimal pain and minimal visible injury. Whereas
in the past, part of the punishment of death was the pain,
humiliation, and degradation of the execution itself, in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the punishment of death
gradually became the loss of life, not the manner of death. As in
the other reforms discussed above, supporters did not see
humanizing executions to make them less painful and less
destructive of the body as hostile to capital punishment itself, but
rather as a means of accommodating the death penalty to modern
sensibilities, reflecting again the somewhat changing role of the
death penalty.
C. Centralizing Executions
The final reform of the death penalty in the premodern era
involved the centralization of executions-their movement from
34. BANNER, supra note 14, at 156.
35. See id. at 189.
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local administration by county officials to state administration in
state penitentiaries." Centralization was partly motivated by the
replacement of hangings with other forms of execution such as
electrocution and lethal gas, which required more expertise to
administer. Cost was likely an additional factor, as it simply was
not cost effective or feasible for local counties to own and operate
their own electric chairs or gas chambers. Centralization of
executions also reflected a more general transition from local,
communal criminal justice practices to more bureaucratic,
hierarchical structures characteristic of modernizing societies. As
with the other reforms, few participants in the decisions of every
state to shift executions from the county to the state level-or
contemporary observers of those transitions-would have
understood the movement of executions to state prisons as an
abolitionist development or as a reform that seriously called into
question the institution of capital punishment itself.
D. Premodern Reforms: On the Path to Abolition?
Even though the reforms discussed above-narrowing of
death eligibility, permitting discretionary grants of mercy, and
concealing, humanizing, and centralizing executions-were not
primarily understood as abolitionist measures, there is the
possibility that the reforms put us on the path to abolition or
reflected values that are ultimately inconsistent with the
continued use of the death penalty. This sort of claim can be
divided into two hypotheses. The weaker of the two offers a highly
deterministic view of these reforms. On this view, the reforms
entail the seeds of the death penalty's destruction. Narrowing the
scope of death-penalty eligibility and requiring the exercise of
discretion in sentencing limit the total number of death sentences,
making the practice more confined, more fragile, and more subject
to question. The process of concealing, humanizing, and central-
izing executions transforms executions into marginal events
marked by state shame instead of robust, collective, social
practices. On this account, deprived of its powerful practical and
symbolic roles, and replaced by imprisonment for many categories
of offenses, the death penalty was placed on a path of inevitable
decline and eventual abolition.
A corollary to this argument is the observation that most, if
not all, of the reforms described above were adopted in many other
36. WILLIAM J. BOWERS, ExECUTIONS IN AMERICA 31 (1974).
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countries more or less at the same time as in the United States,
and in all other Western democracies the reforms were eventually
followed by the declining use and eventual abolition of the death
penalty." Hence, the United States is simply lagging behind other
countries along the same path, and the reforms will function as
important causal contributors to eventual abolition.
The problem with these hypotheses is that the reforms have,
in the past and in the present, happily coexisted with retention.
Narrowing the death penalty to murder has not diminished
significantly the potential pool of the condemned, in part because
the United States experiences a great deal of murder. The
humanizing, concealing, and centralizing of executions has not
triggered much abolitionist momentum. Indeed, there were far
more cries of "hypocrisy" at the time these reforms were embraced
than in contemporary American discourse. Opponents of the
death penalty rarely draw attention to the muted spectacle
executions have become, perhaps fearing that the likely response
would be to advocate a reversion to harsher, more public forms of
execution.
Moreover, the deterministic, causal thesis is undermined by
the sheer time that has elapsed since the adoption of the major
premodern reforms. The narrowing of death-penalty eligibility to
murder (and rape in the South) began in the eighteenth century
and was virtually complete by the early twentieth century, in
practice if not in law. Concealing executions also began almost
two centuries ago, and was fully accomplished by the 1930s. The
process of humanizing executions has been an ongoing process
that dates back at least a century, as does the centralizing of
executions. Thus, although many countries that have abolished
the death penalty adopted many of these same reforms and
arrived on an abolitionist path, it is hard to say that these reforms
in any meaningful sense caused abolition.
A more modest and more plausible account views the reforms
of the premodern era as the product of a set of values that
powerfully motivated abolition in other countries. Even if those
reforms did not cause abolition in other countries, the values
which produced those reforms and abolition elsewhere will likely
motivate abolition in the United States as well. On this view, the
civilizing, humanizing, and bureaucratic impulses that narrowed
the death penalty, centralized its administration, and animated
37. ZIMRING, supra note 7, at 16.
38. Id. at 17-41 (describing the abolition of the death penalty in various
European countries).
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efforts to reduce its pain and horror, are values that inevitably
undermine the continued use of the death penalty.
From this perspective, though there may be bumps along the
abolitionist road in the United States based on some distinctive
aspects of American politics, federalism, or rates of victimization
and violence, eventually "civilizing" and "humanizing" impulses
will win out. Though there is much to recommend this view, there
is a strong case on the other side. The centerpiece of that case is
the notable lack of any strong human-rights-based or human-
dignity-based critique of the American death penalty in contem-
porary American discourse. The United States prides itself as a
democratic, egalitarian, rights-based society, and yet few
contemporary opponents of the American death penalty appear to
claim that the punishment is contrary to some fundamental notion
of civilization or humanity. Indeed, such critiques of the death
penalty on the grounds of human dignity or essential human
rights appeared much more frequently in the discourse of earlier
American eras. When Minnesota discussed abolition at the end of
the nineteenth century, one legislator described the death penalty
as "this harlot of judicial murder [that] smear[s] the pages of our
history with her bloody fingers [and] trail[s] her crimson robes
through our Halls of Justice."" In the debates that led to abolition
in Michigan in the 1840s, the committee recommending abolition
declared, "no man hath a power to destroy life but by commission
from God, the author of it."40
These are not the sort of sentiments frequently aired in or
endorsed by contemporary legislatures (particularly in retentionist
states). In fact, most of the anti-death-penalty discourse in
contemporary debates is pragmatic and utilitarian rather than
rooted in deontological conceptions of human rights or religious
commands. Opponents of the death penalty emphasize its cost, its
arbitrary or discriminatory distribution, and the risk of executing
the innocent. Moreover, the pragmatic focus has been self-
consciously embraced in light of the widespread perception that
Americans have much less discomfort with capital punishment as
a punishment than with its prevailing administration. Along
these lines, the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, a
leader in American anti-death-penalty advocacy, tellingly
propounds "Ten Reasons Why Capital Punishment is Flawed
Public Policy" as the centerpiece of its web-based advocacy." Even
39. BESSLER, supra note 21, at 125.
40. GALLIHER ET AL., supra note 8, at 15.
41. See Death Penalty Overview: Ten Reasons Why Capital Punishment Is
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the two human-rights-based and religious-based arguments
appearing on that list ("Capital punishment goes against almost
every religion" and "The U.S. is keeping company with notorious
human rights abusers"42 ) seem to be one step removed from
directly asserting the immorality of the death penalty. The
reluctance to condemn the death penalty on absolutist moral
grounds is perhaps best illustrated by the tact of contemporary
American opponents to advocate legislative "repeal" of the death
penalty rather than using the morally fraught term "abolition."43
Such a strategy avoids the implication that the decision to end the
practice is morally compelled to the same extent as the duty to end
slavery. "Repeal" also suggests that the decision to withdraw the
death penalty need not be a permanent or irreversible one.
Thus, while the reforms of the premodern era might carry the
seeds of an attack based on emerging norms of civility and
humanity, those seeds do not appear to be particularly ripe. And
though we have travelled on the same road as most abolitionist
states in many of our common reforms, it is not obvious that the
road cannot maintain a divide at the end, with one abolitionist
path and the other retentionist. The question remains whether
the reforms of the present era-most of which are distinct to the
American experience-are similarly able to coexist with retention.
II. Reforms of the Modern Era
The modern era of the death penalty was inaugurated by the
striking decline in death sentencing and executions in the 1960s.
Those declines, together with a myriad of social and political
forces, including the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War,
prompted a rethinking of the role of capital punishment in
America." Prior to the late 1950s, the United States had
experienced a four-decade period in which no American state had
abolished the death penalty." But over the next decade, Alaska
and Hawaii entered the Union as abolitionist states (having
abolished the death penalty as territories just before statehood),
and Delaware, Oregon, Iowa, West Virginia, Vermont, and New
Flawed Public Policy, NAT'L COALITION TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY, http://www.
ncadp.org/index.cfm?content=5 (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
42. Id.
43. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 676.
44. See id. at 667.
45. BOWERS, supra note 36, at 7.
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York all abolished the death penalty for ordinary murder, with
some of those states securing total abolition."
A. Increased Regulation of the Death Penalty
In addition to these political developments, the death penalty
became subject to significant legal regulation for the first time in
American history. The U.S. Supreme Court first signaled the
possibility of meaningful federal constitutional regulation in 1963
when three justices urged the Court (unsuccessfully) to decide
whether the death penalty is excessive when imposed for the crime
of rape." Just a year before, the Court had incorporated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
and applied it against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause." Emboldened by the apparent interest of
some members of the Court in regulating the American death
penalty, as well as the Warren Court's dramatically increasing
role in supervising state criminal processes, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF) launched an attack on capital punishment, in
part because of its manifestly discriminatory administration,
particularly in rape cases." The LDF, via its moratorium
strategy"0 of challenging capital sentences in every jurisdiction
based on all available constitutional grounds, managed to bring
executions to a halt by 1967.5' Five years later, in Furman v.
Georgia,2 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated prevailing capital
statutes based largely on their failure to guide sentencer
discretion; states had authorized the death penalty for a wide
range of crimes, including murder and rape, yet only a fraction of
persons convicted of such offenses had actually been sentenced to
death (much less executed)." The looming gap between death-
penalty eligibility and actual sentencing practices, together with
the failure of states to endorse any conception of the worst of the
worst offenses or offenders, led the Court to find the status quo
46. Id.
47. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
48. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding incarceration to be
excessive punishment for the crime of "addiction" to a controlled substance).
49. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 667.
50. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 107 (1973).
51. Id. at 106-25 (describing the moratorium strategy).
52. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
53. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 364-69 (describing the constitutional
concerns supporting the result in Furman).
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intolerably arbitrary.' Only two Justices-Brennan and Marshall
-concluded that the death penalty was in all cases contrary to
evolving standards of decency,5" and in the wake of the Court's
decision, states passed new capital statutes with an eye toward
limiting or abolishing sentencer discretion to comply with the
Court's mandate.5 6 Four years later, in 1976, the Court reviewed
five of the new statutes, upholding three schemes that confined
the death penalty to aggravated murder via specially enumerated
circumstances , and striking down two schemes that made the
death penalty mandatory for certain offenses."
The modern American death penalty consists of the regime
produced in the wake of the Court's landmark decisions in 1972
and 1976 and its subsequent (and continuing) regulatory efforts.
Those decisions spawned numerous core doctrines, including the
requirements that states narrow the class of those eligible for the
death penalty through the use of at least one nonvague
aggravating factor," that states facilitate robust consideration of a
defendant's mitigating evidence (broadly construed),o6 and that
states withhold the death penalty from offenders deemed
undeserving by contemporary standards (including juveniles,'
persons with mental retardation,62 persons convicted of rape and
other nonhomicidal ordinary offenses,63 and persons convicted
based on the actions of another and who were not themselves
major participants in the offense). 4 In addition, the Court has
developed numerous doctrines regulating other fundamental
aspects of capital proceedings, such as the selection and exclusion
of potential capital jurorse and the minimal requirements for
54. Id.
55. Id. at 362.
56. MELTSNER, supra note 50, at 306-09.
57. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 363-65.
58. Id. at 369-70.
59. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
60. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288-89 (2004).
61. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
62. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
63. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008).
64. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
65. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-34 (1992) (holding that death
penalty defendants are entitled to an impartial jury, defendants in death penalty
cases may exclude any venireperson who would automatically vote for the death
penalty, and a court must allow inquiry into venirepersons' views on capital
punishment if the defendant so requests); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522
(1968) ("[A] sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or
recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they
voiced general objections to the death penalty.").
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effective capital investigation and representation." In the
dozens-indeed hundreds-of capital cases in which the Court has
issued merits decisions over the past four post-Furman decades,
the Court has addressed many other aspects of capital litigation
including permissible types of prosecutorial argument, 7 the
circumstances under which death-sentenced inmates may assert
their factual innocence based on newly discovered evidence," and
the requisite mental bearing for condemned prisoners at the time
of their execution.69
Looking back from the present, it is clear that the
foundational cases of the 1970s heralded a new era in which courts
would play a much more substantial role in the American capital
system. The proliferation of doctrines and subdoctrines touching
all aspects of the capital process-the investigation of crime, the
conduct of both prosecutors and defense attorneys, jury selection,
jury instructions, and so on-certainly have transformed the
American death penalty. But the most important changes might
not be reflected in the content of those doctrines so much as in the
process by which they are enforced. Indeed, the actual require-
ments imposed on states in administering the death penalty are
less strenuous than the legions of cases heard and decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court would suggest."o A disproportionate number
of those cases focus less on the substantive commands of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments than on procedural questions
surrounding their enforcement. In 1996, with the passage of the
66. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-93 (2005) (requiring capital
defense counsel to acquire and review any evidence that they believe the
prosecution might use to establish aggravation for sentencing); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (requiring capital defense counsel to conduct a reasonable
investigation and present reasonable mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 391-98 (2000) (condemning a capital defense attorney's failure to
investigate and present evidence and his lack of preparation as ineffective
assistance of counsel).
67. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) (prohibiting
prosecution in a capital case from inaccurately suggesting to jurors that an
appellate court will reassess the appropriateness of a death sentence).
68. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993) (suggesting that
capital convicts are not entitled to federal habeas review of claims of actual
innocence unaccompanied by claim of separate constitutional violation).
69. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that a state may not
impose the death penalty upon a defendant who is incompetent at the time of
execution and must afford adequate procedural protections to safeguard that right).
70. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 402 (describing the quite minimal yet
complex demands of contemporary capital doctrines).
71. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal
Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of
Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 315, 317.
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,72 Congress
substantially curtailed the ability of federal courts to engage in de
novo review of state court decisions denying relief on federal
claims. Over the past fifteen years, the lower federal courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court have spent an extraordinary amount of
time analyzing the consequences of those changes, and a
significant percentage of federal habeas litigation is devoted to
ascertaining whether the federal courts can reach the merits of
constitutional claims surrounding the implementation of the death
penalty (as opposed to the merits of the cases themselves).73
B. Professionalization of the Capital Litigation Bar
The "constitutionalization" or "legalization" of the death
penalty, the process of subjecting every aspect of the capital
process to federal legal norms and standards (even if quite
minimal), has created a new cadre of lawyers specializing in
capital litigation. Many active death penalty states have
transferred the responsibility for defending capital convictions and
sentences from local district attorneys to lawyers within state
attorney general offices who have particular knowledge about the
operation of federal habeas and the federal constitutional law
applicable to the death penalty. On the defense side, capital trial
representation, state postconviction representation, and capital
litigation in federal habeas have become distinct professional
roles. Before the modern era, capital cases were handled by
appointed lawyers who generally had no specialized knowledge or
training related to the death penalty or postconviction procedure."
Capital appeals and postconviction were likewise handled by
generalist lawyers with no particular training or expertise." The
LDF's efforts in the 1960s marked the first time in American
history that capital litigation became a distinct practice, and the
Court's decisions announcing constitutional limitations on the
death penalty generated a need for greater specialization and
training.7 ' The transformation of capital representation has taken
several decades; it was still not uncommon for generalist lawyers
72. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32,
§ 107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221.
73. Steiker, supra note 71.
74. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 117, 139.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 138-40.
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to represent capital defendants at trials in the 1970s and early
1980s."
Today, though, a group of professional capital litigators
engages in direct representation and postconviction representation
of capital defendants and inmates, and these litigators also
provide support and consulting for private criminal defense
lawyers who work on these cases. This is not to say that every
capital case is actually litigated by expertly trained and
professionally committed capital litigators. But many dozens-
indeed hundreds-of these professionals are involved in capital
litigation nationwide, and their presence reinforces the role of
legal regulation in the American death penalty. Just as the LDF
shared pleadings and strategies in its moratorium effort, so too do
contemporary capital litigators collaborate in designing and
refining legal claims (as well as conducting trainings to ensure
wide availability of the prevailing standard of practice)." As a
result, in many if not most capital cases, the work of professional
capital litigators will be reflected in the range and quality of
claims raised and litigated through multiple stages of the process.
A particularly telling example of the coordination and sophis-
tication of capital defense lawyers can be found in the recent
rounds of lethal injection litigation. Claims surrounding lethal
injection protocols have been pursued vigorously in virtually every
death penalty jurisdiction in the country, with significant success
in forcing jurisdictions to reconsider or redesign their procedures,"
notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of a challenge
to Kentucky's lethal injection protocol in 2008.80
C. Growing Time Between Sentencing and Execution
Overall, the Court's articulation of an extensive body of
capital doctrines, as well as a dense thicket of procedural rules
governing their enforcement, has transformed the American death
penalty most fundamentally by extending the time between death
sentences and executions. Throughout most of our history, weeks
or maybe months separated the pronouncement of sentence and
the ultimate execution." Today, the separation is measured by
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., The Innocence Network Holds an Annual Conference, INNOCENCE
NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/conference (last visited Feb. 20, 2012)
(announcing the Innocence Network's annual conference for capital defense
attorneys).
79. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 74, at 145-46.
80. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62-63 (2008).
81. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 677-79.
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years or decades in active executing states. In a larger group of
inactive states, the separation is simply immeasurable, because
the imposition of legal constraints (in conjunction with other
political and social forces) has created a de facto moratorium on
executions (except, perhaps, for "volunteers" who seek execution
by waiving their appeals).82 Constitutionalization and procedural-
ization have created the new "death-row phenomenon"-long-term
confinement by many prisoners awaiting execution. 3 Whereas the
accumulation of inmates in the late 1960s reached about six
hundred inmates nationwide, which was regarded as an
extraordinary number at that time, today there are several
thousand inmates languishing on death row (more than seven
hundred in California alone).84
This phenomenon destabilizes the death penalty in numerous
ways. First, extending the time between sentence and execution
undercuts two of the most pressing pro-death-penalty arguments:
deterrence and retribution. Deterrence is attenuated when it is
widely understood that an execution will not occur until many
years after sentence, if at all. Moreover, the retributive value of
executions is diminished when the person executed has lived a
"second lifetime" on death row. Given that the death-sentencing
decision now encompasses a broad inquiry into a defendant's
background and character, a lengthy gap between sentence and
execution necessarily excludes relevant information-the second
life lived-from the sentencing decision (and clemency is a poor
substitute for updating the death-worthiness of the condemned).
In more colloquial terms, the death-row phenomenon has
prompted deep psychological questions about whether a person
executed twenty years after the offense and sentence is the same
person who had been condemned two decades earlier.
Second, the death-row phenomenon creates a new moral
problem for the death penalty, one that Justice Breyer and former
Justice Stevens have highlighted on several occasions." The death
82. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations:
Implementation of the Death Penalty in 'Executing' Versus 'Symbolic' States in the
United States, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1870-75 (2006).
83. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 681.
84. Judge Arthur L. Alarc6n & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the
Voters: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature's Multi-Billion-
Dollar Death Penatly Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S51 (2011).
85. Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542 (2009) (Stevens, J., joined by
Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299,
1300 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida,
525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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penalty now encompasses two separate punishments: lengthy
incarceration under very severe conditions (essentially solitary
confinement in many states), followed by an execution. Even if the
public and courts are persuaded that the death penalty itself is not
an excessively cruel punishment, there are increasing doubts
about whether the present regime of lengthy solitary confinement
and subsequent execution is tolerable.
Third, the extensive legal regulation surrounding the death
penalty, with more substantial trials, lengthy appeals, and
functionally indeterminate sentences, has exponentially increased
the cost of capital punishment. Whereas cost was traditionally a
pro-death-penalty argument (why should the state spend money
housing inmates for life?), cost has become decisively an anti-
death-penalty argument, as the modern regulatory apparatus
imposes severe costs that are difficult, if not impossible, to curb."6
Over the past three-to-five years, concerns about the cost of capital
punishment have become a driving force behind efforts to repeal
the death penalty," and such concerns have contributed to the
decisions of prosecutors to forego capital sentences, with dramatic
declines in death sentencing over the past decade."
D. Increasing Focus on Mitigation
Part of the increase in capital costs is attributable to the
emergence of mitigation as the primary focus of capital litigators.
Prior to the modern era, the focal point of capital trials, like their
noncapital counterparts, was the question of guilt versus
innocence." Most states did not allow the presentation of evidence
unrelated to guilt or innocence, 0 and lawyers in capital cases did
little if any investigation unrelated to the commission of the
offense. Indeed, lawyers in capital cases were not typically what
we would today call "death penalty lawyers"; they tended to be
generalists who approached capital cases in the same way they
would approach other serious felony cases."
When the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated mandatory capital
statutes in 1976,92 the Court constitutionalized the requirement of
86. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 74, at 137-50.
87. Id. at 118-24.
88. Id. at 142.
89. MELTSNER, supra note 50, at 68.
90. Id.
91. Carol S. Steiker, Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb: The Seminal
Sentencing of the Century, in TRIAL STORIES, 117, 142-45 (Michael E. Tigar &
Angela Jordan Davis eds., 2007).
92. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
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individualized sentencing. In one respect, the Court was simply
recognizing the national norm of discretion in capital cases, given
the near-uniform rejection of mandatory death sentencing
provisions by the 1960s." But, in its elaboration and enforcement
of a right to individualized sentencing, the Court considerably
broadened the range of evidence relevant to the punishment
decision. 9 Moreover, the "professionalization" of the capital
litigation bar in response to the Court's regulatory efforts signif-
icantly changed the scope and scale of trial defense efforts. Prior
to the 1970s, punishment-phase investigation and advocacy was
rudimentary and secondary.95 By the late 1980s, the emerging
norm for capital-trial representation included a comprehensive
evaluation of a defendant's life and circumstances.9
In 1989, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated
detailed standards for the appointment and performance of
counsel in capital cases. Those standards outlined the wide
range of tasks necessary to effective capital-trial representation,
including investigation into a defendant's medical history,
educational history, special educational needs, military service,
employment and training history, family and social history, and
religious and cultural influences." Fourteen years later, in its
revised guidelines, the ABA described even greater responsi-
bilities, recognizing that effective capital representation requires
the coordination of a capital-punishment team, including a profes-
sional investigator, a mitigation specialist, and all other pertinent
professional experts." The defense approach contemplated under
the standards includes vigorous efforts to seek a plea based on
extensive mitigation investigation, aggressive pretrial motion
practice to assert all nonfrivolous challenges to the prosecution's
evidence and the state capital scheme, and informed jury selection
U.S. 280 (1976).
93. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 298.
94. See Jordan M. Steiker, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Hazards of Predicting the
Future, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 277, 306-10 (John H. Blume & Jordan M.
Steiker eds., 2009) (describing the expansion of the Court's individualization
principle).
95. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 74, at 138-40.
96. Id. at 139-41.
97. American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, AM. B. ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/DeathPenalty-Representation/Standards/National
/1989Guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
98. Id.
99. Am. Bar Ass'n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
913, 925 (2003).
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efforts to ensure reasonable consideration of mitigation evidence."
Acknowledging that this sort of representation requires states to
commit "substantial resources" to capital-trial defense, the ABA
remarked "that any other course has weighty costs-to be paid in
money and delay if cases are reversed at later stages or in
injustice if they are not."0'
The transformation of capital-trial defense, reflected in the
ABA standards (though not fully in capital practice) has been
destabilizing to the continued use of the death penalty in at least
two ways. First, like the additional layers of procedural safe-
guards wrought by increased legal regulation, the emergence of
robust individualization and other trial-preparation standards has
dramatically raised the cost of capital punishment.102 Capital-trial
costs are stunningly greater than their noncapital counterparts. o0
Second, robust individualization fits uneasily with many tradi-
tional and religious defenses of the death penalty, because it
presumes that "an eye for an eye" is an inappropriate command;
the death penalty decision must be as much a judgment about the
offender as the offense." As capital representation increasingly
becomes a sophisticated, collaborative effort to avoid the impo-
sition of a death sentence, capital punishment becomes less
common and indeed less expected as the ordinary response even to
aggravated murder.' High profile cases yielding life sentences in
the wake of extensive mitigation cases-such as those involving
Terry Nichols (who participated in the Oklahoma City bombing), 106
and Brian Nichols (who killed a state court judge and others while
escaping from his rape trial in a Georgia courthouse)' 0 -reflect the
new reality that no crimes, no matter their severity, are invariably
punished by death.
100. Id. at 1043-54.
101. Id. at 930.
102. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 74, at 140.
103. Id. at 137-50 (detailing the "new cost" of capital punishment).
104. See Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 99, at 1062.
105. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-
united-states-1977-2008 (last visited Feb. 6, 2012) (detailing the sharp decline in
executions from 1996 to 2011).
106. See Hung Jury Spares Nichols a Second Time from Death, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 2004, at A7.
107. See Multiple Life Terms for Courthouse Killing in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2008, at A37.
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E. Life-Without-Parole as an Alternative
The final major reform in contemporary capital practice has
been the emergence of life-without-parole (LWOP) as the primary
alternative punishment to the death penalty for capital crimes.0 s
Prior to the 1970s, LWOP was essentially nonexistent within the
United States."'9 LWOP first emerged in a few states in response
to Furman's invalidation of prevailing capital statutes, but its
widespread adoption in subsequent decades was driven by broader
considerations. The rise of violent crime in the 1970s and 1980s,
increasing skepticism about the rehabilitative role of prisons, and
frustration with the lack of transparency in criminal sentencing
all contributed to more punitive sentencing regimes, which
included fewer opportunities for parole. Although death-penalty
opponents tended to support LWOP in death-penalty states in
hopes of reducing capital sentences, the movement toward LWOP
was a crashing wave, embraced in states without the death
penalty, as well as for certain noncapital offenses in states that
retained the death penalty. But death-penalty supporters
recognized the danger LWOP poses for the death penalty."' In
Texas, prosecutors resisted LWOP for years, and reluctantly
capitulated only after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the
death penalty for juveniles, fearing an insufficiently punitive or
protective alternative to death in capital cases involving juveniles.
Although the recent, ubiquitous embrace of LWOP is not
primarily attributable to concerns about the death penalty, its
effects on the death penalty have been dramatic. The emergence
of LWOP is likely the single most important causal factor in the
extraordinary decline in American death sentencing over the past
fifteen years. The number of new death sentences has dropped
almost two-thirds from the number of death sentences obtained in
the mid-1990s, from a nationwide average of 314 per year (1994-
96) to a nationwide average of 98 (2009-11)."' This past year saw
the fewest new death sentences in the modern era, a total of 78
nationwide." 2 LWOP provides substantial cover to prosecutors
who forego capital sentences, as it ameliorates concerns about
108. A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on
Capital Punishment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1842.
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recidivism from the pro-death-penalty side."' In states like Texas,
where a jury must find a likelihood of future dangerousness before
imposing the death penalty,"' the elimination of parole for life-
sentenced offenders strikes at the core of the state's justification
for retention.
Overall, the combined power of legal regulation, robust
mitigation, and the alternative of LWOP has made the death
penalty significantly more expensive, less frequently imposed, and
less responsive to the death penalty's main justifications. Like the
reforms of the premodern era, the reforms of the present day were
not self-consciously adopted to defeat the death penalty. The
imposition of constitutional norms to state capital practices was
the natural outgrowth of a larger movement toward nationalizing
criminal justice standards; indeed, imposing constitutional
safeguards was the alternative to constitutional abolition."" New
legal norms, in turn, transformed capital practices, such that
contemporary capital trials and appeals bear little resemblance to
their pre-Furman counterparts.H6  Some of the transformation
resulted from direct judicial command or legislative action (e.g.,
the establishment of a distinct punishment phase, extensive voir
dire, mandatory postconviction review with appointment of
counsel), but some change is attributable to the creation of a
professional capital punishment bar, which itself was the by-
product of increased legal regulation."' Likewise, LWOP
developed not to limit the death penalty but because of
independent considerations.
III. The Modern Predicament: The Storm Following
the Calm
Is the modern version of the American death penalty a stable
practice? Before Furman, the death penalty appeared particularly
vulnerable. Death-sentencing rates were declining,"' executions
had become virtually nonexistent,"9 several jurisdictions had
113. See A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes
on Capital Punishment, supra note 108, at 1843-44.
114. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2011).
115. Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and Contingency, 125 HARV. L. REV.
760, 778-82 (2012) (reviewing GARLAND, supra note 6).
116. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 74, at 138-41.
117. Id. at 138-40.





severely restricted or abolished the death penalty, 2 ' public support
for the death penalty (as measured by polling data) had reached
an all-time low, 2 ' other Western democracies were on the precipice
of abolition,12 and the death penalty was under federal
constitutional attack. The Court could have issued a fatal blow to
the death penalty, instead of its cacophonous, fractured indictment
of prevailing capital statutes in Furman. Furman's tentativeness,
coupled with the dramatic rise in violent crime, fueled a backlash
to the Court's decision. Instead of continued decline or
constitutional abolition, the death penalty in United States was
revived. Dozens of new capital statutes were passed, the basic
constitutionality of the punishment was affirmed by the Court,
and executions resumed less than five years later.'12
A. Resurgence of the Death Penalty
During the two decades following Furman, the increased
legal regulation of the death penalty likely contributed to its
growth. First, the Court's decisions in 1976 upholding the new
statutes explicitly disavowed the language in some of the Furman
concurrences, insisting that the death penalty was no longer
consistent with evolving standards of decency.'2 4 In so doing, the
Court gave its imprimatur to the continued use of the punishment.
As might be expected, the Court's decision did not directly endorse
capital punishment; rather, the Court framed its conclusion as
addressing the permissibility rather than the desirability of capital
punishment. 2 ' According to the Court, states were entitled to
retain the death penalty on retributivist and deterrence grounds;
given these legitimate objectives, the death penalty did not violate
human dignity.'2 ' But in our culture, saying that the Constitution
does not forbid a practice often confers a special legitimacy, and
the Court's embrace of the new capital statutes undoubtedly
contributed to the subsequent decline in anti-death-penalty
sentiment.
120. Id.; Steiker, supra note 115, at 778.
121. Steiker, supra note 115, at 778.
122. Id.
123. Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 (2007) (detailing
the return of executions in 1977 and their rise in successive years).
124. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181-84 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,
JJ., plurality opinion).
125. Id. at 186 ("[W]e cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature
that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.").
126. Id. at 182-86.
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Second, apart from undermining the broad moral attack on
the death penalty, the Court's assertion of ongoing regulatory
oversight blunted criticism of the states' administration of the
death penalty. Whereas prior to Furman, state capital systems
entrusted the death-penalty decision to the unguided discretion of
prosecutors and jurors, in the post-Furman world states designed
new capital statutes which gave structure to the death-penalty
decision. States enumerated "aggravating factors," which became
indispensable to the imposition of a death sentence, and the Court
policed the application of such factors in individual cases.' As the
Court declared in upholding Georgia's new statute in 1976, "[nIo
longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death
sentence."""
Over the next two decades, the Court reversed death
sentences in large numbers of cases, contributing to the perception
that the death penalty was subject to too much rather than too
little regulation. " This perception of overregulation became
entrenched notwithstanding the fact that the actual demands of
the Court's capital jurisprudence were quite minimal, and the
resulting distribution of the death penalty remained quite
problematic. Judicial intervention thus stabilized capital punish-
ment, and paved the way for executions to resume without the
discomfort evident in the pre-Furman decade. Indeed, other actors
in the capital system-particularly executive officials-appeared
to abdicate their oversight responsibilities in light of the judicial
takeover of the capital system.' In the first two decades of the
post-Furman era, executive clemency fell well below pre-Furman
levels,'' as governors deferred to the judicial system in policing
unjust executions, despite the fact that the courts tended not to
review whether particular executions were actually justified.13 2
By the mid- to late 1990s, the modern American death
penalty appeared more stable and more robust than the death
penalty it replaced. Death sentences and executions rose to their
127. See Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 220 (2006); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 862-64 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-54 (1976).
128. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
129. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 436.
130. Id. at 435.
131. Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 17 (1992) ("Executive clemency
all but disappeared in the United States in the era of hands-on federal court
involvement.").
132. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 435.
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highest levels in years,'13 and the population on death row grew to
over three thousand inmates, approximately seven times the size
of death row in 1976. " To this point, the American death penalty
had received the benefits of legal regulation-increased legitimacy
and decreased nonjudicial scrutiny-but had yet to fully
experience its costs.
B. Recent Destabilization of the Death Penalty
Over the past fifteen years, the new regime the Court set into
motion has been substantially and perhaps irrevocably
undermined. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted
inmates on death rowl3-in Illinois and elsewhere-has cast a
different light on the reliability of the capital system. These exon-
erations resulted in part from the emergence of more sophisticated
technologies for evaluating DNA and other forensic evidence.'
But they also were an unanticipated consequence of the increased
regulation of the death penalty. Many of the exonerations were
uncovered because of the efforts of newly established defense
organizations, such as the Innocence Project (founded in 1992)m11
and Northwestern University's Center for Wrongful Convictions
(founded in 1998).' Although these particular organizations do
not confine their work to capital cases, much of their success on
the capital side is attributable to two new features of the American
death penalty: a network of committed capital litigators and the
lengthy separation between death sentences and executions.
In most capital jurisdictions, specialized death penalty
attorneys, investigators, and mitigation experts are involved in the
representation of death-sentenced inmates, either through direct
representation or through consulting relationships. These
133. Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra
note 105; Executions by Year Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
134. Size of Death Row by Year - 1968-Present, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-
year#year (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
135. Brandon L. Garret, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1648-49
(2008); Ronald Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We Are Moving Towards
Moratoria on Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33
CONN. L. REV. 733, 739-43 (2001).
136. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The
Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law
and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 594 (2005).
137. About the Innocence Project, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
138. About Us, NW. L.: CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
238 [Vol. 30:211
20121 ENTRENCHMENT AND / OR DESTABILIZATION?
attorneys work in a variety of institutional settings, including
state-established capital defense organizations, state post-
conviction offices, private nonprofit capital defense groups, and
federally funded federal habeas assistance projects. Whereas
fewer than a couple of dozen or so attorneys were part of the pre-
Furman network, a much larger group of lawyers, investigators,
and other specialists is involved in contemporary litigation, 3 9
certainly totaling in the hundreds. Although such lawyers and
specialists do not and cannot reach every death-sentenced inmate,
they provide a level of scrutiny of capital verdicts and sentences
that simply was absent under the prior system. Moreover, the
new capital doctrines, filtered through tiers of review in the state
and federal systems, have vastly extended the time between
sentence and execution. This gap has been crucial to the
exoneration enterprise, as many of those found innocent would
simply have been executed under the old regime.' The modern
death penalty is thus characterized by many more opportunities
for, and actual instances of, discovering the fallibility of the capital
system, and this dynamic-virtually absent in the pre-Furman
system-contributes to the destabilization of the death penalty."'
The other major cost imposed by the modern regulatory
system is financial-the exponentially increased expense of trying,
housing, and executing capital offenders."' During the first two
decades of legal regulation, states experienced only a fraction of
these increased costs. Although the Court insisted on a
constitutional right to individualized sentencing in the 1976 cases,
capital trials were not transformed overnight. Well into the late
1980s and early 1990s, states did not adequately fund trial
representation (often imposing absolute caps on attorneys' fees
and expert expenses), and the prevailing level of practice remained
poor, particularly in the South.'4 3 The first interventions by the
U.S. Supreme Court on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds
139. Innocence Network, INNOCENCE NETWORK REPORT: EXONERATIONS 2011, at
12-13 (2011), available at http://www.innocencenetwork.org/annual-reports/
innocence-network-report-2011/at download/file (highlighting over fifty organi-
zations in the United States that specialize in death penalty litigation).
140. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 136 (noting that one Illinois inmate
came perilously close to execution prior to his exoneration).
141. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 425-27 (discussing the abolitionist
potential of "institution-building" reforms, such as the proliferation of specialized
capital defender offices).
142. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 662-63.
143. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843-55 (1994).
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did not occur until 2000,'" and vigorous mitigation development
and presentation did not become the norm until the late 1990s at
the earliest."' At about the same time, states began to fund state
postconviction representation in capital cases, in part to enjoy the
benefits of fast-track federal habeas review ("opt-in" status) under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,'46 though
states have not received those benefits to date. Moreover, death-
row-incarceration costs did not skyrocket until the 1990s. The
national death-row population did not reach one thousand until
1982, two thousand until 1988, three thousand until 1995, and
thirty-five hundred until 1999 (and it has remained above three
thousand since that time).'4  The solitary-confinement style of
death-row incarceration did not become the national norm until
recently, 4" and this cost has become an increasingly large part of
the added marginal cost of the American death penalty. 49
Thus, the extraordinary rise in capital costs is a very recent
phenomenon, and likely a permanent one. The increased trial,
appellate, and postconviction costs are the product of entrenched
legal norms, and the heightened incarceration costs appear to be
an unavoidable public policy concession given (perhaps exag-
gerated) fears of violence on the part of death-sentenced inmates.
These increased costs, in turn, together with growing public
skepticism about the accuracy of the capital system and the near-
universal embrace of LWOP as the alternative punishment to
death, have radically altered the calculus of prosecutors, who have
sought death sentences much less frequently over the past years,
sending the absolute number of death sentences to modern-era
lows."o Last year marked the first time in the modern era that
death sentences nationwide dipped below one hundred, and the
seventy-eight death sentences represent less than one-third of the
144. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-93 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 519-38 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391-98 (2000).
145. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 669.
146. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66
(2006).
147. Size of Death Row by Year - 1968-Present, supra note 134.
148. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 32, at 679. Texas, for example, did not move
its death row to the "super-max" facility in West Livingston, Texas, until 1999;
prior to that time, Texas death-sentenced inmates were housed in ordinary prison
cells and could participate in a work program. Id.
149. See, e.g., Alarc6n & Mitchell, supra note 84, at S107 (indicating that death-
row incarceration in California costs an additional $100,663 per death-row inmate
in 2010, or about $71 million for the 713 death-sentenced inmates on California's
death row).
150. Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra
note 105.
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number of sentences obtained in any year between 1982 and 1999,
and one-quarter of the number obtained in the peak 1994-96
years. 15 1  This precipitous decline in death sentences is not
attributable to the also-noteworthy decline in murders, as the
death-sentencing rate (death sentences per murder) has also
declined remarkably over the past thirteen years.152
C. Looking Forward: An Abolitionist Future?
The dramatic decline in death sentencing might reflect a
passing moment, much like the decline in the decade leading up to
Furman. Perhaps a return of the high violent-crime rates of the
1970s and 1980s would fuel another explosion in death sentences.
But the hallmarks of the modern regime-exorbitant capital costs,
increased scrutiny of capital verdicts and sentences through a
professionalized capital bar, and the establishment of LWOP as
the norm for capital murder-constitute institutional pressures
against death sentencing. Those institutional pressures, in turn,
have a feedback loop to legal regulation. One of the major
concerns in Furman was the rarity of the death sentences as a
response to death-eligible crimes.'53 In the words of Justice White,
commenting on the administration of the death penalty in the pre-
Furman era, "[Tihe penalty is so infrequently imposed that the
threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to
criminal justice."'5 4 The increase in death sentencing and
executions over the following twenty-five years insulated the death
penalty from this sort of challenge, but the recent dramatic
declines give contemporary force to that argument. Thus, legal
regulation of the death penalty can reduce use of the death
penalty, which in turn carries the potential for greater legal
regulation, including abolition.
Moreover, the same institutional pressures contributing to
the decline in death sentencing have recently led to repeal in
several jurisdiction, including Connecticut,"5 Illinois,"' New
Jersey, "7 and New Mexico.'5 8 These legislative reversals, though
151. Id.
152. Death Penalty Sentences Have Dropped Considerably in the Current Decade,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-
sentences-have-dropped-considerably-current-decade (last updated Feb. 16, 2012).
153. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
154. Id.
155. S.B. 280 (Conn. 2012).
156. 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105 / 5.786 (2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 119-1 (2011);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124 / 1-99 (repealed 2012).
157. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2007).
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significant in themselves, are also significant to the prospects for
judicial abolition. Over the past two decades, various members of
the Court have expressed increasing doubts about the
sustainability of the American death penalty. Justice Blackmun, a
dissenter in Furman and a member of the Court that upheld the
new statutes in 1976, lamented, just prior to his retirement, that
legal regulation of the death penalty had been unsuccessful on its
own terms."9 He announced he would "no longer.. . tinker with
the machinery of death" because of the failure of contemporary
regulation to solve the problems of arbitrariness and
discrimination that justified the Court's intervention in the first
place.'6  More recently, Justice Stevens likewise concluded that
the death penalty was no longer constitutionally viable."' In
Justice Stevens's view, the incapacitation justification for the
death penalty has been undercut by the introduction of LWOP, the
deterrence justification lacks empirical ,support, and the
retributive justification cannot be squared with the trend toward
humanizing executions.12 Other justices, too, have recently
lamented the failure of contemporary regulation to achieve its
avowed goals"' or to be sufficiently responsive to accuracy
concerns in light of demonstrated error in capital cases.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court's proportionality cases
have developed a new methodology for gauging evolving standards
of decency, and the new measures are particularly hospitable to
judicial abolition, especially if more states were to reject the
penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia,' the Court imposed a propor-
tionality bar against executing persons with mental retardation,
despite the fact that a majority of death penalty states permitted
the punishment."' The Court noted that the absolute number of
states prohibiting the practice was less significant than the
158. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (West 2009).
159. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
160. Id.
161. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 78-81.
163. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(cataloging the defects in prevailing capital practice notwithstanding the Court's
regulation and urging a requirement that jurors-not judges-make the ultimate
determination whether to impose the death penalty).
164. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207-10 (2006) (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (calling for a new capital
jurisprudence informed by the lessons of wrongful convictions).
165. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
166. Id. at 315, 321.
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"consistency of the direction of change.""'7 Hence, if several more
jurisdictions were to defect to the abolitionist or repeal camp, the
Court might view such movement as significant evidence of
contemporary rejection of the practice altogether. In subsequent
decisions, the Court imposed additional proportionality limitations
on the death penalty, precluding the execution of juveniles and
persons convicted of nonhomicidal, ordinary offenses (including
the rape of a child).' These decisions reflect a shift in emphasis
from the number of states embracing a practice to other indicia of
prevailing values, including expert opinion, international opinion,
polling data, and actual practices. The declining and exceedingly
rare use of the death penalty on the ground, in light of these
decisions, constitutes powerful evidence of its inconsistency with
prevailing moral norms-not to mention expert and international
opinion, which are increasingly aligned against capital
punishment.
Thus, the modern project of regulating the death penalty has
increasingly provided a framework for revisiting the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty itself. Indeed, the legal regulation of
the death penalty, adopted as an alternative to constitutional
abolition, has provided a yardstick for measuring the death
penalty's success. A decision invalidating the death penalty in the
early 1970s would have marked an abrupt break from prevailing
legal norms given the total absence of legal regulation of capital
punishment to that point. Today, the Court can highlight the
aspirations of the new legal framework and emphasize the
distance between the prevailing reality and those aspirations,
much in the way Justices Blackmun and Stevens renounced their
constitutional support for the death penalty notwithstanding their
prior endorsement of the post-Furman schemes.'
Conclusion
A number of recent death penalty scholars have noted the
oddity of our prevailing system, in which the death penalty seems
ill-suited to survive given the demands of contemporary legal
norms and the accompanying crushing costs. David Garland, for
167. Id. at 315.
168. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441-47 (2008) (prohibiting the death
penalty on Eighth Amendment grounds for the rape of a child where the crime was
not intended to, and did not, result in the victim's death); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty on Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds for offenders under eighteen years of age at the time of the
crime).
169. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
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example, describes the present American death penalty as
"peculiar" given that "the forms through which it is now enacted
seem ambivalent and poorly adapted to the stated purposes of
criminal justice."170  Frank Zimring likewise highlights the
"contradiction" between the values underlying the death penalty
and those required of due process."' But neither of these scholars
appeared particularly sanguine about the prospects for abolition in
the near future. In Garland's view, the death penalty, dysfunc-
tional though it is, nonetheless serves social purposes other than
those advertised,17 2 and in any case is insulated from total
abolition by the decentralization of authority over criminal law.
Zimring, writing almost a decade ago, was observing the zenith of
capital sentencing and executions, and though he expressed
confidence in the eventual abolition of the death penalty,"' the
trajectory of the late 1990s did not seem promising. Today, the
conflict between the legal regulation of the death penalty and its
continued use appears more permanent and more destructive than
the early decades of regulation would have predicted. In short, the
modem American death penalty-with its unprecedented costs,
alternatives, and legal regulatory framework-seems newly
vulnerable to judicial invalidation. Reform of the death penalty
and its abolition might well be on the same path.
170. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 13.
171. ZIMRING, supra note 7, at 130-31.
172. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 285-310.
173. Id. at 310.
174. ZIMRING, supra note 131, at 205 ("[The] ultimate outcome [of abolition]
seems inevitable in any but the most pessimistic view of the American future.").
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